DarkGate is a Windows malware family that combines a commodity loader, information‑stealer, and full‑blown remote access trojan (RAT) in a single toolkit. It is sold as Malware‑as‑a‑Service (MaaS) on underground forums and actively maintained, with multiple major versions observed since it first appeared around 2017–2018.

Operators use DarkGate to:

  • Gain initial access via phishing, Teams/Skype messages, SEO poisoning and fake installers.
  • Deploy DarkGate as an AutoIt‑based loader that unpacks an encrypted payload and establishes C2.
  • Turn the infected host into a foothold for credential theft, lateral movement, data exfiltration, and follow‑on payloads (including ransomware).

This post walks through how DarkGate spreads, how the infection chain works, its internal capabilities, and what defenders should log, hunt, and block to keep it out of their networks.

1. What Exactly Is DarkGate?

DarkGate is a Windows malware family that has evolved from a relatively simple loader into a full ecosystem:

  • Loader – gets code onto the victim system, often wrapped in AutoIt scripts and compiled binaries.
  • RAT – gives interactive remote access (command execution, file management, shell).
  • Stealer – grabs credentials, browser data, crypto wallets, and other sensitive information.
  • Delivery platform – commonly used to drop other malware families (ransomware, stealers, additional loaders).

Threat intel teams and vendors consistently describe DarkGate as:

  • A commercial / commodity malware sold on invite‑only Russian‑language forums.
  • Actively developed, with multiple tracked versions and a large command set (dozens of opcodes) exposed by C2.
  • A tool that any motivated affiliate can rent and plug into their own phishing or malvertising campaigns.

From a defender’s point of view, you can think of DarkGate as a Swiss‑army knife for access and monetisation: once it’s running, the attacker can choose whether to quietly steal data, stage a bigger intrusion, or bring in ransomware partners.

2. Initial Access: How DarkGate Gets In

DarkGate doesn’t have a single fixed delivery vector. Instead, operators test whatever channel gives them the best combination of reach + trust + low detection.

2.1 Classic malspam and file attachments

For several years DarkGate campaigns looked very similar to Emotet‑style malspam:

  • Lures: fake invoices, HR documents, shipping notifications, banking messages.
  • Attachments: malicious Office docs, PDFs, ZIPs, or MSI installers.
  • Goal: convince the user to open a file or run an “update / viewer / document unlocker” that silently loads the malware.

Common attachment patterns you’ll still see in telemetry:

  • Invoice_<random>.pdf or Doc_<random>.pdf containing a link or embedded script.
  • ScannerResults.zip masquerading as output from tools like “Advanced IP Scanner”.
  • Update_NVIDIA_Driver.msi, NotionSetup.msi, etc. that pretend to be legitimate installers.

2.2 Microsoft Teams and Skype abuse

As email filtering improved, some operators shifted to collaboration apps:

  • Threat actors compromise accounts or spin up fake identities.
  • Targets receive a Teams or Skype chat from someone impersonating IT, HR, or a senior exec.
  • The message includes a SharePoint/OneDrive link or attached file that kicks off the DarkGate chain.

This technique works because chat platforms:

  • Feel more “internal” and trustworthy than random email domains.
  • Often have weaker inline file/URL inspection compared with mature secure email gateways.

2.3 Fake installers and SmartScreen bypass

One of the more worrying campaigns associated with DarkGate exploited CVE‑2024‑21412, a Windows SmartScreen bypass.

The chain, simplified:

  1. User receives a PDF or link using a Google Ads / DoubleClick open redirect.
  2. The redirect sends them to a compromised site hosting a malicious MSI installer.
  3. The MSI abuses the SmartScreen bypass to run code without the usual warning flow.
  4. The installer sideloads a DLL that decrypts and loads DarkGate into memory.

From the user’s perspective, they just installed “iTunes” or “Notion”. Behind the scenes, they’ve handed over a backdoor.

2.4 SEO poisoning and malvertising

DarkGate operators also borrow tricks from other loaders like GootLoader and FakeBat:

  • SEO poisoning: create rogue download pages for popular tools such as “Advanced IP Scanner”.
  • Malvertising: buy search ads or place malicious JavaScript on compromised sites.
  • Unsuspecting admins who search for these tools click the first result, download a Trojanised installer, and run it.

The net effect: administrators — the people you most want to protect — are a prime target.

3. Inside the DarkGate Infection Chain

Regardless of how it starts, a lot of DarkGate campaigns follow a similar multi‑stage pattern.

3.1 Stage 0 — The lure

  • Email, Teams chat, SEO result, malvertising banner, or a PDF is the entry point.
  • Goal: a single successful user action: click link / open file / run installer.

3.2 Stage 1 — Downloader or dropper

The first stage usually:

  • Downloads a cab/zip/msi from a remote server; or
  • Extracts an embedded resource that looks like a legitimate tool or DLL; then
  • Executes scripting logic (often AutoIt, PowerShell, or batch) that prepares the main payload.

In many DarkGate chains, defenders see:

  • A PDF or shortcut that fetches a CAB file → unpacks → runs an MSI.
  • The MSI writes one or more AutoIt compiled binaries and encrypted data blobs to disk.

3.3 Stage 2 — AutoIt‑based loader

DarkGate heavily abuses AutoIt, a legitimate Windows automation language:

  • Attackers compile AutoIt scripts into .exe using the official AutoIt compiler.
  • The script contains logic to decrypt an embedded payload from disk or resources.
  • The decrypted content is the DarkGate core module, typically injected into another process.

Benefits for the attacker:

  • AutoIt executables look like generic admin tooling.
  • The language is flexible; operators can add anti‑VM, anti‑debug, delay execution, and evasion logic as simple script flags.

3.4 Stage 3 — Payload execution and persistence

Once decrypted, DarkGate:

  • Injects itself into a legitimate process (process hollowing or similar) to blend in.
  • Sets up persistence via registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, services, or startup folders.
  • Contacts the C2 infrastructure and registers the victim.

From this point on, DarkGate behaves like a full‑featured RAT/stealer under remote control.

4. DarkGate Capabilities: What It Can Do On a Host

Different versions support slightly different features, but broadly DarkGate provides:

4.1 Reconnaissance and environment awareness

  • Collects OS version, architecture, hostname, domain/workgroup.
  • Enumerates running processes, installed AV/EDR, and sometimes virtualisation artefacts.
  • Can perform anti‑VM and anti‑sandbox checks, delaying or aborting execution if suspicious conditions are detected.

4.2 Credential and data theft

DarkGate often includes or can load modules to:

  • Steal browser credentials (cookies, saved passwords, session tokens).
  • Target crypto wallets and browser extensions holding keys.
  • Grab RDP, VPN, and messaging client credentials where possible.
  • Enumerate and exfiltrate documents from specific folders (Desktop, Documents, cloud sync directories).

Even if the operator never runs “hands‑on keyboard”, credentials alone can fuel future BEC, account takeover, and lateral movement.

4.3 Remote access and command execution

As a RAT, DarkGate supports a large command set, commonly including:

  • File operations: upload, download, delete, rename.
  • Process operations: start, kill, inject into other processes.
  • Shell interaction: spawn an interactive shell or run arbitrary commands.
  • Screenshot capture and sometimes hidden VNC (HVNC) to control the desktop invisibly.

In practice, once a host is “DarkGate‑ed”, the operator has near‑full control.

4.4 Loader for other malware

DarkGate is rarely the final goal. Affiliates and crime groups use it to stage:

  • Ransomware (including families like Black Basta and others).
  • Additional stealers such as Lumma or RedLine.
  • Lateral‑movement tooling (Cobalt Strike beacons, custom loaders, tunnelling tools).

This makes fast detection essential: stopping DarkGate early can prevent a much more damaging second phase.

5. Forensic Artefacts: Where DarkGate Leaves Traces

If you suspect DarkGate, here are the key artefact categories to focus on.

5.1 File system

Look for:

  • Recently created AutoIt executables, often with generic names like setup.exe, updater.exe, or tool‑themed names.
  • Unusual .cab, .msi, or .zip files in Downloads, %TEMP%, or installer staging directories.
  • Dropped DLLs next to legitimate binaries (potential DLL sideloading pairs).

File hashing + VT/TI enrichment is your friend here.

5.2 Registry and persistence

Common persistence methods (varies by campaign and operator):

  • HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run entries pointing to AutoIt exes or renamed binaries.
  • Scheduled tasks that execute from user‑writable paths.
  • Services configured with suspicious binaries referenced via svchost‑style names or generic display names.

Timeline analysis (which keys appeared right after a download / installer run) helps distinguish DarkGate from noisy background entries.

5.3 Processes and LOLBins

DarkGate chains frequently involve:

  • Office apps (winword.exe, excel.exe) or readers launching msiexec.exe, wscript.exe, powershell.exe.
  • AutoIt executables spawning child processes and then disappearing, leaving a hollowed parent.
  • LOLBins like forfiles.exe, rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe used to execute scripts or DLLs.

If your EDR supports it, hunt for process ancestry patterns like:

  • teams.exe → browser → msiexec.exe → unsigned binary in %TEMP%.
  • WINWORD.EXE → wscript.exe → powershell.exe with long base64 arguments.

5.4 Network & C2

DarkGate’s C2 patterns evolve, but common elements include:

  • Outbound HTTPS or HTTP to domains with low reputation / recent registration.
  • Requests often blend in with normal traffic (standard ports 80/443, common user agents).
  • Periodic beaconing: regular POSTs at fixed intervals with small encrypted payloads.

Correlate:

  • First connection time to a suspicious domain.
  • The process owning the socket (often the injected host process).
  • Any DNS queries that align with the phishing / lure timeline.

5.5 Log sources to prioritise

To investigate or hunt DarkGate at scale, prioritise:

  • Mail / gateway logs (if delivered by email).
  • Chat / collaboration logs (Teams, Skype, Slack integrations where available).
  • Proxy / firewall / DNS logs for outbound destinations and beaconing.
  • EDR / Sysmon for process creation, module loads, and network events.
  • Endpoint artefacts: browser history, prefetch, registry, and scheduled tasks.

6. A Simulated DarkGate Incident Walkthrough

To tie this together, here’s a realistic scenario.

6.1 The initial alert

  • SOC receives an alert: encoded PowerShell executed on a workstation from %TEMP%\setup.ps1.
  • EDR marks the parent as an unsigned AutoIt executable dropped shortly before.

6.2 Rewinding the timeline

Working backwards you find:

  1. 09:08 – User receives an email appearing to be from “IT Support” with subject: Teams update required.
  2. 09:09 – User clicks a button labelled “Download Teams security update” that points to an HTTPS URL on a compromised site.
  3. 09:09:15 – Browser downloads Teams_Update_2024.msi to Downloads.
  4. 09:09:30 – msiexec.exe installs the MSI; shortly after, an AutoIt executable appears in %TEMP% and runs.
  5. 09:09:40 – AutoIt process writes config.dat and an encrypted blob, then launches setup.ps1.
  6. 09:09:45 – powershell.exe with base64 parameters spawns, injects code into a living‑off‑the‑land process, and deletes some on‑disk artefacts.

This chain is textbook DarkGate or similar loader behaviour.

6.3 Confirming DarkGate

You extract:

  • The MSI, AutoIt executable, and any dropped DLLs.
  • The decrypted payload from memory (via EDR’s memory dump feature or manual triage).

Static and dynamic analysis shows:

  • AutoIt script with logic to decrypt an embedded blob using a custom XOR/key schedule.
  • Network connections to a suspicious domain over HTTPS with an unusual path pattern.
  • A configuration structure containing campaign ID, operator ID, and dozens of possible C2 commands.

Threat intel lookup confirms the payload matches a known DarkGate hash / YARA rule.

6.4 Scoping the incident

Your next questions:

  • Did any other users receive the same email or Teams message?
  • Do logs show other hosts contacting the same C2 domains?
  • Are there any machines with the same Run keys, scheduled tasks, or AutoIt executables?

Using EDR and SIEM searches, you:

  • Identify three more endpoints that executed the MSI.
  • Find one server that received connections from an infected workstation using stolen RDP credentials.

At this point, DarkGate has moved from a single compromised host to an access‑broker foothold inside your network.

6.5 Containment and eradication

Actions typically include:

  • Isolate affected endpoints from the network.
  • Kill DarkGate processes and associated scripts.
  • Remove persistence (Run keys, tasks, services, startup items).
  • Reset credentials that may have been harvested (local admin, domain accounts, VPN, privileged SaaS).

Only once persistence is removed and credentials are rotated should you return systems to production, ideally after a known‑good reimage in high‑risk cases.

7. Detection & Hunting Ideas

Here are practical detection angles you can adapt to your environment.

7.1 Mail and collaboration controls

  • Block or flag emails where:
    • Sender domain is recently registered and not in your address book.
    • Attachments are PDF/ZIP/MSI combined with “scanner”, “invoice”, “update” keywords.
  • For Teams/Skype:
    • Restrict or closely monitor external tenants.
    • Alert on file transfers from new external contacts that lead directly to MSI/EXE downloads.

7.2 Endpoint analytics

Look for telemetry patterns that strongly suggest loader activity:

  • Office apps or PDF readers spawning msiexec.exe, wscript.exe, or powershell.exe.
  • AutoIt executables (look for AutoIt v3 strings or known PE resources) spawning processes then exiting.
  • Processes running from %TEMP%, Downloads, or user profile paths that:
    • Quickly spawn child processes.
    • Open network connections to unknown domains.

You can also look for encoded PowerShell that pulls remote scripts, especially when launched from recent MSIs or AutoIt binaries.

7.3 Network hunting

In network or proxy logs:

  • Identify first‑time‑seen domains accessed by only a handful of hosts.
  • Combine with user‑agent, URI, and TLS fingerprint information to spot odd beaconing.
  • Hunt for small, periodic HTTPS POSTs from unusual parent processes.

If you maintain a TI feed of DarkGate‑related indicators:

  • Enrich all outbound connections with that feed.
  • Back‑search at least 30 days of logs to ensure no quietly infected systems pre‑date your first detection.

7.4 Sample YARA / detection content

Most vendors publish YARA or Suricata rules for DarkGate or its packers. Use those as a starting point and adapt them to your environment:

  • Focus on behavioural detections (AutoIt + decryption + process injection) in addition to static string matches.
  • Tag DarkGate rules as high priority so any hit triggers thorough triage.

8. Hardening Against DarkGate and Similar Loaders

Stopping DarkGate isn’t about a single magic rule; it’s about layers of defence that make the infection chain hard to complete.

8.1 User awareness with real‑world lures

Security training should cover:

  • “IT updates” or “Teams security patches” arriving via email or chat instead of your standard software portal.
  • Unsolicited download links for tools like Advanced IP Scanner, remote admin tools, or document viewers.
  • The rule of thumb: if it didn’t come from your company’s normal distribution channel, don’t install it.

8.2 Application control and script restrictions

Where possible:

  • Use application allow‑listing (e.g., only trusted installers and signed binaries can run).
  • Restrict MSI installs so only admins can perform them, ideally via a central deployment system.
  • Constrain PowerShell with Constrained Language Mode and script block logging.
  • Monitor and, if possible, block AutoIt in environments where it’s not legitimately used.

8.3 Patching and configuration

  • Apply security patches promptly, especially for SmartScreen and browser‑related vulnerabilities.
  • Harden collaboration tools:
    • Restrict which external domains can communicate with your Teams tenant.
    • Turn on suspicious file detection and link inspection where available.
  • Enforce MFA and monitored privileged access to make stolen credentials less immediately useful.

8.4 Logging maturity

DarkGate incidents are far easier to manage when you already have:

  • Centralised logging from endpoints, proxy, email, and identity systems.
  • Detections tuned around code execution from user directories, unusual installers, and external collaboration traffic.
  • A pre‑defined IR runbook for loader infections (triage, isolation, scoping, comms, recovery).

9. Final Thoughts

DarkGate is a good example of how commodity malware has levelled up:

  • It blends mature real‑world tradecraft (malvertising, SEO poisoning, Teams abuse, SmartScreen bypasses) with a flexible, modular codebase.
  • It lowers the barrier for less skilled actors to run professional‑grade intrusion campaigns.
  • And it plays a central role in access‑broker and ransomware ecosystems, where initial access is just another product to sell.

For defenders, the takeaway is not to memorise every opcode or cryptographic trick in DarkGate’s code. Instead, focus on the repeatable patterns:

  • Users being convinced to run unexpected installers.
  • AutoIt or other “admin” tools abused as loaders.
  • Scripted decryption + process injection behaviour.
  • Beacons from suddenly active, low‑reputation infrastructure.

If your controls can spot and disrupt those patterns early, DarkGate becomes just another noisy loader rather than the start of your next major incident.

And if you do encounter it in your environment, treat it as a serious warning shot: someone was willing to pay for a MaaS loader targeting your users. That usually means your organisation is already on someone’s list — and they may come knocking again.