Weekly Threat Trends — Week Commencing 22nd December 2025
With staff on leave, change freezes in place, and everyone distracted by end-of-year deadlines, threat actors use December to push BEC, gift-card fraud, shipping scams, and high-impact ransomware. This week’s post focuses on holiday operating risk and how to keep control when the lights are dimmed.

The week of 22–28 December 2025 falls squarely across the Christmas period for many organisations.
It is exactly when people want to switch off — and exactly when attackers know defenders are distracted,
change windows are tight, and coverage in the SOC is thin.
This week’s trends revolve around holiday operating risk:
- Business email compromise (BEC) and payment fraud targeting finance teams working from home.
- Shipping, travel and gift-card scams that blur the line between “personal” and “corporate” risk.
- Ransomware and destructive wipers timed for change freezes and skeleton-crew on-call rotations.
- Fraud and account takeover in consumer-facing portals, riding on peak retail and refund activity.
In between all of that: Merry Christmas — this post is about keeping the network calm enough that you can actually enjoy a day off without waking up to a ruined change freeze.
Top Trends at a Glance
- Holiday BEC and Invoice Fraud – convincing “urgent payment” and “bonus adjustments” sent to thinly staffed finance and payroll teams.
- Gift-Card and Voucher Abuse – attackers pushing employees to buy codes, or draining corporate and customer reward balances.
- Shipping, Delivery and Travel Scams – phishing around parcels, boarding passes, and hotel portals that double as initial access.
- Change-Freeze Ransomware and Wipers – high-impact operations scheduled for low staffing and minimal appetite for risky response actions.
- Retail and Customer-Portal Account Takeover – credential stuffing and token reuse during peak login periods.
- Operational Readiness Gaps – escalation paths, approvals, and incident ownership becoming unclear once key people go on leave.
End-of-Year BEC and Invoice Fraud
The biggest, most consistent theme this week is payment fraud. December is prime time:
- Finance teams rush to close books.
- Suppliers push invoices and last-minute renewals.
- Leadership is on the move, working sporadically from phones and airport lounges.
Threat actors exploit this by sending well-timed, well-researched BEC lures:
- Fake “updated banking details” emails from supposedly known suppliers, timed just before scheduled payments.
- “Urgent wire for acquisition / bonus / charity donation” messages claiming to be from executives.
- “We need to release year-end bonuses early, please approve attached payroll file” attachments that either:
- Directly request a fraudulent batch upload.
- Contain malware as a second play.
Common traits in this week’s examples:
- Attackers use long-running recon periods:
- Monitoring compromised mailboxes for weeks to learn payment cycles.
- Replying in existing threads with in-line responses, not brand new emails.
- The fraud requests are small enough to slip under normal controls:
- 20–80k per transaction.
- Within existing supplier relationships.
- Leveraging “we need this done before everyone goes on leave” pressure.
Defensive measures to emphasise right now:
- Reinforce out-of-band verification:
- Any banking detail change must be confirmed via a known phone number or portal, not email.
- Clearly communicate “holiday fraud rules” to finance:
- It is acceptable — encouraged — to delay payment if verification is incomplete, even under “executive pressure”.
- Ensure your secure email gateway and mail rules:
- Flag external senders clearly, even in reply chains.
- Highlight lookalike domains and newly registered senders, particularly in supplier-themed mail.
From an incident perspective, remember that BEC is as much fraud and governance as it is “technical security”.
Get finance, legal, and cyber aligned before things heat up.
Gift-Card, Voucher and “Secret Santa” Abuse
The second big holiday theme is gift-card and voucher fraud, which continues to leak from the “consumer” side into corporate environments.
Patterns this week include:
- Classic “CEO/manager asks you to buy gift cards” scams re-skinned around:
- “Secret Santa for the team.”
- “We want to surprise staff/clients before the shutdown.”
- Attacks targeting corporate reward portals:
- Points and vouchers accrued via travel, fuel, or partner programs.
- Redemption accounts protected by weak or reused credentials.
- Criminals combining BEC and gift-card fraud:
- Gain access to a manager’s mailbox.
- Send realistic internal messages instructing staff to:
- Purchase vouchers.
- Share codes or photos.
- “Keep this quiet, it’s a surprise.”
Where it touches corporate risk:
- Money is lost directly if staff use corporate cards to buy gift codes and send them to attackers.
- Compromised reward accounts may reveal:
- Travel patterns.
- Hotel preferences.
- Relationship data with key suppliers or clients.
To manage this risk:
- Communicate a clear policy: no executive or manager will ever ask staff to buy gift-cards via email or chat.
- Encourage scepticism around:
- “Surprise” initiatives requested out-of-hours.
- Messages asking for secrecy from accounts that rarely interact with staff.
- Ensure reward portals and travel accounts:
- Use strong, unique passwords and MFA.
- Are reviewed for unusual redemption activity, particularly during the holiday period.
A short, well-timed awareness note to staff this week can neutralise a large chunk of this threat surface.
Shipping, Delivery and Travel-Themed Phishing
With parcels and travel bookings peaking, delivery and itinerary scams are everywhere, targeting both personal and corporate identities.
Observed lures include:
- Fake SMS and emails from couriers:
- “We attempted delivery; pay customs/duty to release your parcel.”
- “Your package is delayed, click here to reschedule.”
- Airline and travel portal impersonation:
- “Check in now to confirm your seat.”
- “Your booking is at risk; update card details.”
Why this matters for organisations:
- Staff often use corporate email and devices for travel confirmations and delivery notifications.
- Clicking on a personal-looking link from a corporate device can:
- Drive them to credential harvesting pages.
- Drop malware or steer them into a ClickFix-style script chain.
- Some campaigns specifically target:
- Staff responsible for shipping, logistics, or reception.
- Employees in companies that heavily rely on physical deliveries.
Best practices to reinforce:
- On managed devices:
- Prefer going to courier/airline sites directly instead of tapping links in messages.
- Treat any page asking for card details or login as suspicious if it comes from an unsolicited message.
- For corporate shipping workflows:
- Ensure official notification addresses and portals are documented and shared.
- Anything outside those channels should be verified before staff pay fees or update details.
A small twist on this theme is QR-based delivery confirmation in physical notes:
- Cards left on desks or in mail rooms with QR codes leading to fake “reschedule delivery” portals.
- QR codes circumventing some URL-filtering controls.
Treat QR codes as links you cannot see — with the same scepticism.
Ransomware and Wipers in Change-Freezes
Operationally, late December often includes:
- Change freezes on production systems.
- Reduced maintenance windows.
- Skeleton incident response and IT staff.
Attackers know this. Ransomware crews and destructive actors are increasingly timing:
- Initial ingress and staging in the early weeks of December.
- Detonation during:
- Night of 24th/25th.
- New Year’s Eve.
- Weekends overlapping public holidays.
This week’s cases show:
- Ransomware deployed via existing access (RDP, RMM, domain admin) rather than zero-day exploitation.
- Heavy use of:
- Backup enumeration and suppression.
- Hypervisor and storage-targeted encryption.
- Some operations skipping classic file-encryption and instead deploying wipers:
- Destroying boot records.
- Corrupting hypervisor storage.
- Aiming to maximise downtime during a period where escalation and approval paths are slow.
Key defensive moves before the holidays fully hit:
- Validate offline and immutable backups:
- Confirm restore procedures for critical systems.
- Test at least one recent restore end-to-end, including authentication and access workflows.
- Clarify authority during a change freeze:
- Who can authorise:
- Emergency firewall changes.
- Network segmentation or shutdowns.
- Rapid backup restores and DR failover.
- Who can authorise:
- Ensure on-call playbooks explicitly handle:
- Overnight ransomware events.
- Complete site or hypervisor outages.
- Situations where key leaders are unreachable for hours.
The aim is simple: make sure your on-call team knows they are allowed to act, even when the environment is technically in change freeze.
Retail, Customer-Portals and Account Takeover
For any organisation with customer portals, retail sites, or loyalty programs, this week is a pressure test.
Threat actors are running:
- Large-scale credential stuffing campaigns:
- Using breach combos targeting email+password pairs.
- Exploiting customers’ tendency to reuse credentials.
- Token replay and refresh attacks:
- Reusing stolen session tokens from stealers and infostealers.
- Hitting login endpoints with valid sessions to:
- View and edit personal data.
- Place orders.
- Drain balances and vouchers.
These attacks are often mixed with legitimate peak traffic, making detection harder:
- Spikes in login events look normal.
- Password-reset and helpdesk volumes increase for both real and fraud-driven reasons.
For defenders, priority controls include:
- Strong, enforced MFA for high-risk actions:
- Changing addresses.
- Altering saved payment methods.
- Transferring loyalty points.
- Risk-based access mechanisms that:
- Step up authentication for suspicious IPs, devices or geos.
- Flag impossible travel or unusual device combinations.
- Monitoring for:
- Multiple accounts accessed from the same IP or device fingerprint within short windows.
- Sudden changes in shipping address, particularly to high-risk regions.
- Unusual patterns in returns, refunds and voucher redemptions.
Fraud and cyber teams need to work closely together — many of these events show up first as chargebacks and customer complaints, not SIEM alerts.
Operational Readiness in a Half-Empty Office
Across all these technical trends sits a simple reality: people are on leave.
Miscommunications and gaps this week typically look like:
- Incidents languishing because:
- Ownership is unclear.
- Ticket queues are watched by junior staff without decision authority.
- On-call staff unsure:
- Which executives or business owners to wake up.
- How far they are allowed to go in making impactful changes.
- Delays in fraud responses because:
- Banking and finance contacts have limited availability.
- Internal sign-off chains are longer at the exact time attackers want to move fast.
Practical steps to plug these gaps:
- Publish a holiday escalation chart:
- Primary and secondary contacts for:
- Security incidents.
- Payment and BEC concerns.
- Communications and legal decisions.
- Primary and secondary contacts for:
- Make sure role-based backups exist:
- At least one alternate per critical function (SOC lead, IAM admin, backup admin, finance approvals).
- Give on-call teams pre-authorised actions:
- Up to a clearly defined threshold, they can:
- Block or disable accounts.
- Isolate hosts or subnets.
- Put holds on payments flagged as fraudulent.
- Beyond that threshold, they know which person to contact next.
- Up to a clearly defined threshold, they can:
The goal is to avoid incidents sliding for 8–12 hours simply because nobody is comfortable making a call.
Actions for the Week of 22–28 December
To make this week survivable, consider the following concrete actions.
For Finance and Payroll
- Push a short, clear reminder:
- Verify all changes to banking details out-of-band via known contacts.
- Treat any “urgent, confidential payment” request as suspicious, especially if it bypasses normal workflow.
- Implement temporary rules:
- Two-person approval for new beneficiary or banking changes.
- Holds on large, unusual transfers until callbacks are completed.
For Staff in General
- Send a simple, non-technical awareness note:
- We are seeing gift-card, parcel, and travel-themed scams.
- No manager will ever ask you to buy gift cards via email or chat.
- Do not run command-line instructions sent to you over email or Teams, even if they claim to “fix” security issues.
- Remind staff that corporate devices are still corporate even when used for personal orders and travel.
For Security and IT
- Validate holiday on-call and escalation:
- Names, numbers, backups, and authority are all current.
- Run a quick ransomware readiness check:
- Confirm locations and health of backups for key systems.
- Ensure at least one person on call knows how to initiate restores and DR.
- Tighten detection for:
- RDP, VPN, and RMM activity outside normal hours.
- Large outbound data transfers from unexpected systems.
- New inbox rules and forwarding configured just before close of business.
Closing Thoughts (and a Merry Christmas)
This week is always a strange mix of quiet corridors and frantic inboxes. Attackers know that:
- People are tired.
- Processes are relaxed.
- Teams are partially staffed.
That is why holiday periods are no longer quiet times in threat intel — they are some of the most opportunistic windows of the year.
The counter is not paranoia; it is deliberate, pre-planned operating discipline:
- Clear fraud and BEC rules for finance.
- Simple awareness for staff on gift-card, parcel, and travel scams.
- Strong on-call and escalation arrangements for security and IT.
- Tested backups and runbooks ready for ransomware or wiper events.
If you can get those basics in place, you dramatically reduce the chance of spending Christmas Eve rebuilding a hypervisor or arguing with a bank about fraudulent transfers.
So, genuinely: Merry Christmas and happy holidays.
The aim of all this is to keep your December as uneventful as possible — so the only fire you deal with is the one under the BBQ, not in your production network.